While Africa Emerges as Hidden Strategic Battleground
By Kemi Osukoya | GEOECONOMICS
The long-anticipated consequential meeting between President Donald J. Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping next week is shaping up into a tightly packed agenda spanning tariffs, Taiwan, Iran and technology controls, including on artificial intelligence—but beneath the surface, analysts say a far larger strategic contest is accelerating, with Africa increasingly central to U.S.-China rivalry over critical minerals and industrial supply chains.
The meeting was originally scheduled for late March but was postponed due to the U.S.-Israel war on Iran that started in late February.
In a phone call on Thursday, Scott Kennedy, Senior Advisor and Trustee Chair in Chinese business and economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who recently returned to the U.S. after two-and-a-half weeks in Beijing meeting with officials and businesses from the Chinese public and private sectors, said the postponement had effectively broadened the agenda.
“The six-week delay in the summit has actually been important because [the U.S. and China] have been able to further develop the agenda,” he said, describing what he called “the five Bs and the three Ts” basis of the agenda.
On the U.S. side, he listed “Boeing, beef, beans, the Board of Trade, and the Board of Investment.” China’s priorities, he said, center on “Taiwan, tariffs and technology,” with AI now emerging as an additional strategic layer.
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Kennedy cautioned that major outcomes remain uncertain. “There’s still some big questions that are not going to be answered until they actually meet,” he said, including whether the two sides can even agree on a joint statement, something past summits have often failed to produce.
He also argued that Beijing enters the talks from a position of relative confidence. “China basically comes out stronger,” he said, pointing to its resilience under U.S. tariff pressure and its diversification of economic relationships. “The U.S. is not investing sufficiently in the foundations of its economic power,” he added.
Former American diplomat and chair of CSIS’ China studies Edgard Kagan, said both sides believe they hold leverage. “Both sides believe that they have leverage. Both sides believe that the other side needs something from them. And, frankly, both sides are right,” he said.
He added that the summit is as much about political signaling as policy substance. “Both leaders are going to be very eager to show their publics and also the international community their ability to manage this relationship skillfully.”
Taiwan is expected to be one of Beijing’s most sensitive priorities. American Political scientist Bonny Lin said China has been laying diplomatic groundwork, including earlier messaging from Xi Jinping that Taiwan is “the most important issue in U.S.-China relations,” alongside pressure to curb U.S. arms sales to Taipei.
Lin said Beijing increasingly frames Taiwan as part of a broader “One Family” narrative while pressing Washington to avoid what it calls interference in cross-strait affairs.
Iran has also emerged as a parallel pressure point. Kagan said it has become a tier-one issue that is absorbing a huge amount of [Trump’s] time, with the U.S. expected to press Beijing to use its influence in Tehran, including on nuclear constraints and maritime security.
Lin noted that China has simultaneously defended Iran’s right to civilian nuclear energy and criticized sanctions, signaling opposition to further U.S. coercive measures.
On trade, analysts’ expectations remain modest and focused on stabilizing frictions rather than structural reform.
International Economist Philip Luck noted deeper issues are unlikely to be addressed. “There are some issues that we simply shouldn’t expect them to discuss,” he said, citing China’s industrial overcapacity and broader consumption imbalances.
Instead, discussions are expected to center on agriculture, export controls, and short-term market access. U.S. soybean and beef exports to China, he stressed, remain below expectations.
Kennedy added that both sides are already applying quiet pressure ahead of the talks, including export licensing delays on the U.S. side and regulatory friction on key inputs from China.
Africa moves into the strategic frame
While the summit is formally bilateral, analysts increasingly see a third arena shaping the underlying balance: Africa.
The U.S. and China are intensifying competition across the continent for critical minerals and industrial infrastructure tied to electric vehicles, artificial intelligence systems, semiconductors and defense technologies.
Experts say both sides recognize that control of supply chains for cobalt, lithium, copper, manganese, graphite, rare earths and platinum-group metals will shape the next industrial cycle.
Africa holds dominant global reserves of several of these inputs—including cobalt in the Democratic Republic of Congo, lithium in Zimbabwe and Namibia, copper in Zambia and the DRC, manganese in South Africa and Gabon, and platinum-group metals in South Africa.
China and Chinese firms already maintains a significant advantage across global mining ecosystems, particularly in refining and processing, having spent years embedding themselves in African extraction, logistics and industrial zones, giving them leverage across midstream supply chains.
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The U.S. is now seeking to narrow that gap through mineral security partnerships with DRC, Zambia, Nigeria, and others, financing corridors like the Lobito Corridor, as well as efforts to diversify refining away from China.
For African governments, this has translated into greater bargaining power. Countries including the DRC, Zambia, Namibia and Zimbabwe are increasingly demanding local processing, infrastructure-for-minerals deals and technology transfer rather than raw exports.
That shift could prove pivotal depending on the trajectory of U.S.-China relations. A more stable relationship may allow African nations to attract investment from both sides simultaneously. At the same time, a more confrontational one could sharpen competition for mining rights, infrastructure corridors, and political alignment.
The competition is also playing out in African diplomacy.
Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te‘s recent visit to Eswatini last week underscored this competition. Despite reported Chinese pressures on several African governments, including Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles, to deny overflight access to the Taiwanese government, the delayed trip and State Visit, eventually proceeded,—highlighting that the small southern African nation remains strategically symbolic as one of Taipei’s last footholds in Africa even as Beijing continues a yearlong campaign to persuade African nations to align with a “One China” policy.
South Africa is another point of interest at the center of this broader contest, experts noted. China is its largest trading partner, with ties spanning mining, energy, infrastructure, and manufacturing, and has also increasingly focused on local industrial processing and value-chain integration rather than raw extraction.
For China, South Africa functions as both a gateway into continental industrial networks and a political anchor within the BRICS+ alliance. On the U.S., side, though the relationship is strategically important, it has increasingly become more complex given Pretoria’s alignment with China and Russia on elements of global governance.
With Taiwan increasingly intertwined with this mineral competition—the island dominates advanced semiconductor manufacturing, while China holds significant influence over upstream mineral inputs—analysts say together they underpin global supply chains for AI and advanced computing.
Beijing’s broader strategy links mineral leverage, industrial policy and geopolitical pressure, including the use of rare earth export controls in past trade disputes
CSIS’s Bonny Lin noted that Taiwan remains central to Beijing’s strategic framing, including pressure on U.S. arms sales and diplomatic positioning.
Across the briefing, analysts described a broader structure—three layers of competition—defining U.S.-China rivalry: First, critical minerals—control over extraction, refining, and supply chains. Second, technology—including semiconductors, AI infrastructure, and advanced manufacturing. Third and finally, diplomacy—including Taiwan recognition, BRICS+ alignment, and trade architecture.
Kennedy described the core challenge as managing interdependence without escalation, warning against “escalatory spirals.”
Despite expectations of a high-profile meeting, analysts said the summit is unlikely to resolve underlying tensions.
As Kagan and International Monetary Fund Chief Kristalina Georgieva put it candidly, most countries are watching for stability rather than alignment.
“Virtually every country in the region [and the world] wants to avoid a really bad relationship between the U.S. and China,” Kagan said, “while also resisting the emergence of a tightly coordinated G-2 system.”
The result, analysts said, is likely to be managed rivalry—competitive but contained, with spillovers increasingly shaped not just in Washington and Beijing, but across Africa’s mines, ports and industrial corridors.
